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Abstract 
This article explores the implications of founding transdisciplinary collaborations 
of knowledge production in critical realism. We call such equal partnerships of 
researchers and practitioners knowledge alliances. Using the distinction between 
the referents that we refer to (what our research is about) and our references (our 
research about that), we show that practitioners can contribute to the process of 
knowledge production by providing access to referents and producing references 
but also by achieving relevance. Researchers and practitioners bring different types 
of knowledge. To become excellent, knowledge production should be organized in 
ways, which engage these different types in a constructive interplay. We call this 
approach potential-oriented, which we put in contrast to the empiricism of 
evidence-based research and policy-making. Our deliberate choice of the term 
potential-oriented reflects the shifts in philosophy suggested by critical realism, 
but also a sensitivity for how practitioners communicate and express themselves. 
Keywords: knowledge alliance; critical realism; transdisciplinarity; social 
cohesion; urban development 
Introduction 
The authors of this article have for many years researched on the increasing urban and 
societal cleavages and how to deal with them. In many of these projects, we have worked 
together with representatives of different knowledge, like urban inhabitants, public 
institutions, civil society organisations and social movements. Such collaborative 
knowledge production can be seen as transdisciplinary since it combines 
‘interdisciplinarity with the participation of extra-scientific actors’ (Jahn, Bergmann, and 
Keil 2012, 5). We have opted to call them knowledge alliances (KA). On the basis of 
many such projects, we have experienced that a knowledge alliance may contain a 
potential of both dealing with societal challenges and developing scientific knowledge. 
To succeed with that, however, it should be underpinned by critical realism, we will argue 
in this article. Reflecting the shifts within philosophy suggested by critical realism but 
also to facilitate the communication with collaborating practitioners, we call it a potential-
oriented approach. 
The dominant approach to deal with relevant societal problems, however, is 
evidence-based policy making based on empiricist epistemology. It relies on statistical 
correlations, which ‘remain the socially sanctioned way to arrive at "evidence-based" 
research to inform public policy’ (Bhaskar, Danermark, and Price 2018, 76). Empiricists 
concentrate on identifying and naming constant conjunctions of observable phenomena. 
Evidence-based policy-making results from the ‘the utilitarian turn in research funding 
policy’ (Solesbury 2001). Such explanatory models tend to focus on symptoms, not 
causes (Jessop 2015), neglecting the crucial distinction between the problems and how 
one defines them. Instead, the problems are taken for granted and because of this, we call 
it a problem-oriented approach, again reflecting a sensitivity for the communication and 
thinking of practitioners. 
In this article, we will put forward a potential-oriented approach, drawing on 
critical realism, in contrast to such a problem-oriented approach, associated with the 
empiricism of evidence-based research and policy-making. The objective is to explore 
the implications of founding transdisciplinary collaborations of knowledge production, 
here known as knowledge alliances, in critical realism. How can a potential-oriented 
approach explain the significance of knowledge alliances? Bhaskar, Danermark, and 
Price (2018) have provided a theoretical justification for interdisciplinarity. We want to 
take it one step further to embrace transdisciplinarity too. 
The term KA emerged of our joint involvement in an EU-wide social platform - 
Social Polis–Social Cohesion in the City (2007-2010) – as a co-coordinator and external 
expert. Its overall objective was to develop a research agenda to foster social cohesion in 
cities by critical analysis of research to date, and by constructing a social platform of 
networks for dialogue and agenda setting (Cassinari et al. 2011). The term KA appeared 
in a publication by Stigendal (2010): ‘This new term aims to stress the mutuality needed 
in the further work. Scientific and analytical knowledge is important, but so is the 
practical knowledge of stakeholders.’ A few years later, Novy, Habersack, and Schaller 
(2013, 432) defined KA as ‘sustainable learning and research partnerships composed of 
researchers and practitioners in all their diversity, which are based on an attitude of 
respect, self-reflexivity and curiosity, a disposition for mutual learning and a culture of 
dialogue and democracy.’ 
At that time, the term had also been introduced in Europe 2020, however with a 
definition limited to alliances between ‘education and business’, in line with the dominant 
neoliberal agenda of competitiveness. A wider definition was used by the Commission 
for a Socially Sustainable Malmö (so-called Malmö Commission), set up against the 
backdrop of increasing health inequities and inspired by the WHO. One of its two 
overarching recommendations to reduce inequities in living conditions and make societal 
systems more equitable was to establish knowledge alliances. By that, the commission 
means ‘equal partnerships between researchers and stakeholders such as administrations, 
associations, trade and industry, focused on combining excellence and relevance’ 
(Stigendal and Östergren 2013, 131). As part of our objective in this article, presented 
above, we will show how relevance should be seen, not as something external to 
excellence but as integral to it. 
In chapter 2, we will proceed by introducing, step by step, the conceptual building-
blocs of our potential-oriented approach. The chapter ends up by associating relevance 
with one of three validity criteria, the other two associated with the references and the 
referents, respectively. By references, we mean unities of signifiers and signifieds. 
Distinguishing references from referents belongs to the main characteristics of critical 
realism. Using the distinction between references, referents and relevance, scientific 
knowledge should be validated against all the three. That implies a redefinition of 
excellence and paves the way for practitioners to contribute. In chapter 3, we will use the 
distinction to show how practitioners may contribute to assessing referents, producing 
references and achieving relevance. This will be supported by critically reviewing the 
literature and by presenting research results and techniques used in KA in which we have 
participated. 
A Potential-Oriented Approach to Knowledge 
As mentioned in the introduction, the choice of the term potential-oriented reflects the 
shifts within philosophy suggested by critical realism. Firstly, instead of asking the 
epistemological question of how to produce knowledge, we should begin by asking the 
ontological question about what we need to assume to make knowledge possible. 
Secondly and within ontology, critical realism urges us to shift our main attention from 
the actual events to the mechanisms that causes these events, or, with another term, to the 
potentials. To do that, we need to assume that reality consists of not only what we can 
observe and experience, and what intrudes on us. That belongs to a certain level of reality, 
called the empirical. We make sense of these impressions and experiences by 
understanding them as expressing a specific content associated, in turn, with another level 
of reality, called the actual. The level of the real embraces it all, i.e. not only what appears 
to be (the ‘empirical’) and that which has been actualized (the ‘actual’), but also the 
potentials inherent in the real which are not necessarily ethically positive. 
It is crucial to understand potential-oriented approach first of all as a term, apart 
from what it means as a defined concept. Drawing on semiotics, we call the former the 
signifier and the latter the signified. Our deliberate choice of the term reflects not only 
the shifts in philosophy mentioned above, but also a sensitivity for how practitioners 
communicate, think and express themselves. It sounds appealing to those who want to 
transform existing situations of exclusion and segregation as well as those that believe in 
the potentials of ordinary people, for example the ones of young migrants. We have used 
this appeal to incorporate a critical realist philosophy without necessarily naming it, by 
translating what the practitioners call potential as positive potential. Examples range from 
the intercultural competence of young people to the emancipatory potential of the theatre 
of the oppressed (Stigendal 2018) or the deinstitutionalization of social services like 
Housing First (Weinzierl, Wukovitsch, and Novy 2016). That allows us then also to talk 
about negative potentials, like the ones causing inequality inherent in capitalist societies 
(Stigendal 2018). 
Playing on the Distinction between Signifiers and Signifieds 
This sensitivity has been developed in a number of transdisciplinary projects, whereas a 
major one which both of us participated in was Social Polis (see above), where academic 
and professional knowledge was mobilised to grasp different aspects of social cohesion 
(Miciukiewicz et al. 2012). What happens, then, when stakeholders from different 
countries are invited to work together with the researchers in an EU project on the theme 
of social cohesion (Stigendal 2010)? That depends on how familiar each partner is with 
the term (signifier) and what they mean with it (signified).  
In Sweden, for example, the term social cohesion is hardly used and there is no 
general understanding of what it means, in contrast to the EU where a whole policy area 
exists called cohesion policy (Crescenzi and Giua 2016). The point then is that 
practitioners from Sweden do not really know what the researchers are talking about. 
Practitioners have been invited to a project like Social Polis, but the researchers have 
already decided about both the signifier and the signified, i.e. the issue in terms of its 
empirical form (the term) and its actual content (the idea and/or concept). That would not 
be a problem if the practitioners were familiar with at least the signifier (the term) and 
perhaps also had their own understanding of it (the concept). But if they are not and if 
they do not?  
‘What does the issue called social cohesion include?’, a practitioner would ask. Is 
the work that I do as a teacher or social worker included? Are my experiences in projects 
like Housing First of interest for research on social cohesion? What problems and 
experiences am I allowed to discuss? The lack of familiarity with the issue, the name of 
it as well as what it means, create uncertainty among practitioners. How should they know 
what the issue includes? They might regard social cohesion an academic issue, as it does 
neither stem from everyday life nor from the public debate, and feel alien to it. 
We find the distinction between signifier and signified useful, as it illuminates a 
common problem when researchers and practitioners work together, as described above. 
As critical realists, however, we cannot restrict ourselves to this distinction because then 
we would commit the ‘epistemic fallacy’, assuming that reality corresponds to the 
knowledge that we have about it (Jessop 2015, 239). This assumption constitutes the basis 
of the philosophical position called social constructivism (for a systematic critique see 
Sum and Jessop 2013, 131). 
Knowledge as both Reference and Referent 
In contrast to empiricism and social constructivism, critical realism claims that ‘there are 
not only signifiers (e.g. words) and signifieds (concepts) but also referents’ (Fairclough, 
Jessop, and Sayer 2002, 5). This means that knowledge differs from what it refers to. We 
make sense of reality, for example by producing knowledge. By doing that, we create 
references to what we make sense of, the referents. We will treat the concept of references 
as unities of signifiers and signifieds. 
These real phenomena, the referents, are the objects that we focus on or that 
simply may intrude on us. We respond by trying to make sense and meaning of them. In 
this way, generally called semiosis, we reduce the complexity of the world (Sum and 
Jessop 2013). An obvious example is language, as all thinking is made through language. 
But complexity is reduced by structuring social relations, too. These are the two modes 
of complexity reduction; semiosis and structuration. Both of them have to be made, but 
not from scratch: Women and men make history under given circumstances. Thus, at a 
general level of abstraction, the social world can be understood as consisting of semiosis, 
structuration and agency. 
In reducing complexity, the referents can be observable objects, but also 
knowledge. Thus, knowledge can be both a reference and a referent. As the latter, it exists 
regardless of what each one of us as individuals think about it, although represented by 
others. In order to be able to use it, however, we need to make clear for ourselves and 
others what the knowledge is about. That requires work and takes time. To the extent that 
we succeed, knowledge becomes a reference for us, which then also means that we 
reproduce it as a referent, i.e. something that some actors have referred to in the past and 
others might learn from it in the future. Knowledge depends on human agency to be both 
produced and reproduced. 
In addition to the one between signifier and signified, the distinction between 
references and referents can deepen the explanation of the difficulties that often appear 
in collaborations between researchers and practitioners. As an example, practitioners 
probably have experiences of exactly the same referents that the researchers refer to by 
calling it social cohesion (Novy, Coimbra Swiatek, and Moulaert 2012; Schiefer and van 
der Noll 2017), but the practitioners might call it something else. All too often, however, 
practitioners do not have the time or opportunity to go into a great deal of theorizing 
around the words they put on their experiences. Perhaps they are victims of discourses 
floating around, full of nice signifiers, buzzwords, disseminated by commercial media, 
religious organizations or other powerful institutions of sense-making. 
Just as researchers, thus, practitioners try to make sense and meaning of the reality 
they experience. The practitioners might, perhaps, prefer to express the sense and 
meaning they make of their experiences in images, artistic expressions or story-telling, 
describing a concrete-complex situation, creating specific non-academic references to 
capture the multidimensionality of a referent. This might be a challenge for researchers, 
but could also provide opportunities to develop a proper use of imaginaries and metaphors 
in argumentation. Could what the practitioners express also be regarded as knowledge? 
It depends on what we mean by knowledge. 
Recognising different Types of Knowledge 
In line with the above, knowledge should be regarded as a way to reduce the complexity 
of the world. As all semiosis, it has to be made. Due to the demands for something to be 
called knowledge, it should be seen as produced, requiring human agency. That does not 
imply that the production of knowledge starts from scratch. On the contrary, somebody 
who wants to produce knowledge needs to appropriate existing knowledge and make it 
his/her own. Thereby, knowledge becomes personal, something which the appropriator 
knows what it is about and how to use it. Such personal knowledge differs from the 
collective knowledge that preexists us and which we may contribute to but only by first 
making it our own personal knowledge. Collective knowledge exists as a commons, 
between us, heavily structured by power relations. 
Learning means to link up to collective knowledge, but not passively. If we want 
to learn, we have to make knowledge our own and that requires work. The marks are 
supposed to confirm to what extent we have succeeded, albeit their validity should not be 
taken for granted. Moreover, learning occurs also outside the educational institutions and 
we should assume that everyone has knowledge. It is obvious, however, that knowledge 
differs. The knowledge of a researcher is not the same as the knowledge of a practitioner, 
for example a child care worker. Furthermore, this difference cannot be understood on 
the same quantitative scale. The former is not necessarily better than the other, but they 
are simply qualitatively different. 
This qualitative difference has been highlighted from the early beginning of 
western thinking, in particular by Aristotle in his distinction between episteme, techne 
and phronesis (Bernstein 2011 [1983]; Flyvbjerg 2001, 57). As Flyvbjerg (2001, 2) puts 
it, ‘phronesis goes beyond both analytical, scientific knowledge (episteme) and technical 
knowledge or know-how (techne) and involves judgments and decisions made in the 
manner of virtuoso social and political actors.’ For the purpose of this article, we will not 
make much use of the distinction between techne and phronesis, but treat them together 
as practical knowledge. Regarding episteme, in its turn, we will distinguish between two 
types of knowledge, depending on what level of reality it primarily refers to. The one type 
refers to observable phenomena and can be called empirical knowledge. The other type 
is called theoretical, focusing on identifying causal relationships and transfactual 
mechanisms. Its primary referents belong to the levels of the actual and the real. 
To underline, the distinction between these three types of knowledge concerns the 
primary referents. For example, empirical knowledge always also includes theory, 
explicitly as well as implicitly, which makes it differ from information and experience. It 
cannot be regarded as, for example, pure enumerations of facts. Similarly, what we here 
call theoretical knowledge usually also consists of empirical referents, if only as 
examples. The primary referent for practical knowledge, in its turn, is practice. Being able 
to, for example, write at a computer (techne) or solve conflicts, synthesize knowledge and 
evaluate arguments (phronesis) is what we mean by practical knowledge. 
We favour research that organizes knowledge production in ways where different 
types of knowledge are constructively engaged in an interplay. Neither social 
constructivists nor empiricists can acknowledge this, because our understanding builds 
on the assumption that the predominantly practical knowledge of practitioners exists in 
the first place as a potential. For that reason, we need to start by believing in it and analyse 
it as an abstraction separately from its particular context; i.e. what we are doing in this 
chapter. Social constructivists cannot do that, especially the strong version of it (Sayer 
2000, 90), because in their view a reality outside the corresponding knowledge about it 
does not exist. Inclining to idealism, they do not allow themselves to assess the efficacy 
of the extra-discursive. Whatever practitioners bring with them, it cannot be knowledge 
as long as it has not been signified as such. And if it does qualify as knowledge, it depends 
on the constructions of the social constructionists. Thereby, by focussing on texts and 
discourses, they grant themselves a privileged power position as experts in interpretation. 
According to empiricism, potentials do not exist because they cannot be pointed 
out and observed. The scientist is expected to concentrate on identifying and naming 
constant conjunctions of observable phenomena. If, for example, a pupil freak out at a 
school, empiricists tend to attribute it to other observable phenomena, for example the 
family, as such a conjunction has been established by repeated observations. Empiricism 
does not allow for an understanding of, for example, the potentials inherent in the 
organization of the school, which may cause certain pupils to freak out. But such 
potentials might be the main problem. For a critical realist, it is perfectly legitimate to 
draw such a conclusion, given of course that we possess knowledge on the potentials of 
school organizations. A teacher may draw a similar conclusion, but then perhaps on the 
basis of experiences and as part of her/his predominantly practical knowledge, in this case 
phronesis. 
Empiricists, however, stick to what seems to be the problems, not for example our 
definition of it or the actualized potentials which causes it. For that reason we call such 
an approach, based on evidence-based policy-making, a problem-oriented approach. Its 
underlying positivism was exposed to a devastating critique already more than 30 years 
ago in geography (Harvey 2010 [1973]; Sayer 1985) and earlier than that in social science 
by C. Wright Mills (2000 [1959]). But it has regained prominence and a reason to that is 
its ability to proclaim itself as excellent. To show why and how involving practitioners in 
research can overcome such a restricted, empiricist understanding of academic 
excellence, a broader as well as more theoretically founded definition of excellence is 
crucial. 
Incorporating Relevance in Excellence 
The last decades have seen an upsurge in initiatives to establish collaborations between 
researchers and practitioners. In 2009, the European Commission published a report about 
it by the MASIS (Monitoring Policy and Research Activities on Science in Society in 
Europe) Expert Group called Challenging Futures of Science in Society (see Felt et al. 
2009). The report highlights this trend of making science more relevant to society, but in 
parallel there has been an opposing trend which reaffirms the autonomy of science under 
the traditional notion of ‘excellence’, consolidated by the continuing emphasis on 
publication indicators (and international journal publications) in evaluations. The MASIS 
report (Felt et al. 2009, 16-17) criticises this notion of excellence, which runs the risk of 
endangering the pursuit of relevance and favours ‘decontextualized and globalised 
science while context-related and more local research, dedicated to specific problem 
solving, is disadvantaged.’ However, relevance should not be seen as contradictory to 
excellence, the MASIS report insists and urges for a combination. 
We would like to agree, but we believe that there is a need of theoretical 
justification. What makes science autonomous? In our view, this depends on the approach 
to knowledge, founded in a certain ontology. If knowledge is seen as being derived 
logically from theories, in line with the form of inference called deduction, those who do 
not know about these theories or what deduction means cannot contribute. Similarly, if 
knowledge is seen as being induced from empirical observations, in line with the form of 
inference called induction, those with no skills in statistical analysis have no access. 
Therefore, each one of these modes of inference consists of power relations. When they 
reign in isolation, they effectively privilege some and exclude others from research as a 
whole. 
Critical realism does not force us to choose between those two modes of inference, 
nor does it force us to abandon them. To justify that cooperation can lead to better 
knowledge, an ‘anti-imperialist’ (Bhaskar, Danermark, and Price 2018, 81) meta-
theoretical perspective is required. Critical realism provides that, and is for that reason 
‘intrinsically supportive of interdisciplinarity’ (Bhaskar, Danermark, and Price 2018, 82). 
A methodology underpinned by critical realism acknowledges both deduction and 
induction. The deductive form of inference is of central importance in all science and it 
should be applied when the logical validity in the scientific argumentation is assessed. 
The inductive form of inference, in contrast, should be assigned a much more limited 
validity, because, as Danermark et al. (2005, 87) suggest, “the objects of science are not 
primarily empirical regularities, but structures and mechanisms”.  
In addition to these two, a critical realist methodology embraces also abduction, a 
form of inference, associated with pragmatism, where one moves from one mindset to 
their conclusions in another mindset and sees something as something else. In contrast to 
deduction and induction, abduction does not claim its validity based on formal logic, but 
due to its usefulness, or with another word, relevance. A fourth form of inference which 
also relies on relevance is retroduction, probably the one most associated with critical 
realism. Retroduction means to ask questions like how something that appears to exist 
really can exist; if it is what appear that exists or something else. To take an example: 
Evidence-based problem-orientation exists because it actualizes the potential inherent in 
empiricist ontology of perceiving the world as composed of atomistic events in closed 
systems (Bhaskar 2010 [1989], 8f). 
Danermark et al. (2005, 113) regard these four forms of inference as constituents 
of an explaining social science. Together, they enable us to move from the imagined 
concrete to more and more tenuous abstractions. From there, the scientific work should 
proceed by incorporating more determinations at lower levels of abstraction, moving 
from abstract-simple to concrete-complex analyses (Marx and Engels 1986, 37; Jessop 
2015, 243). It is a ‘reflexive spiral movement’ of ‘refining conceptual entry points in the 
light of substantive findings and deepening, widening, and modifying the empirical 
analysis’ (Moulaert, Jessop, and Mehmood 2016, 179). In such a process of knowledge 
production practitioners can fulfil an important role, which abduction and retroduction 
opens the door for. Using all the four modes of inference contains the potential for 
incorporating practitioners on equal footing, valorizing respective strengths and thereby 
transforming power relations.  
For such research to become excellent, we will suggest a redefinition of 
excellence by using three forms of validity associated with, in turn, the referent, the 
reference and relevance. Firstly, scientific knowledge should be assessed with regard to 
what it explains about its referent object, at whatever level it exists. Secondly, the 
assessment should be made with regard to the consistency of the explanation as a 
reference object. Thirdly, seeing knowledge as production as well as reproduction 
requires us to assess it with regard to its relevance, which we associate with usefulness in 
the wider societal context.  
From a critical realist viewpoint, all the three should be subsumed under the notion 
of practical adequacy (see for example Sayer 1992, 70; Danermark et al. 2005, 25) and 
seen as three forms for assessing the use-value of knowledge (Marx 1996, 45). We may 
call the three of them the referent, the reference and the relevance validity criteria of 
excellence. To become excellent, therefore, research needs to fulfil all of these criteria. 
Relevance is, thus, not a feature separated from excellence but an integral part of what 
makes research excellent. In the next chapter, we will highlight the contributions of 
practitioners with regard to both the referents, the references and relevance. 
Knowledge Alliances 
As stated in the introductory chapter, we call such transdisciplinary collaborations 
knowledge alliances (KA). In our definition, we stress the mutuality, attitude of respect, 
self-reflexivity, curiosity, and a culture of dialogue and democracy. KAs consist of equal 
partnerships between researchers and practitioners, in line with the notion of interactive 
research (Svensson, Ellström, and Brulin 2007). The partners enter the KA from different 
directions and with different combinations of the three forms of knowledge as well as 
knowledge interests. The point is then to make a context of the KA where these 
differences can thrive, benefit each other and be taken advantage of in a joint process of 
production (Novy, Habersack, and Schaller 2013). 
To share knowledge in its diverse forms, it has to be actualized and made explicit, 
which could be done if practitioners and researchers work together in favourable and 
long-term social contexts and arenas. This requires mutual respect of the respective 
professional merits, but also on other grounds, for example owing to the courage, sense 
of humour or political experience of practitioners. Only then, power asymmetries can be 
reduced and practitioners be involved based on conditions favourable to all partners 
(Hirsch Hadorn et al. 2008a). This enables both to make the produced knowledge their 
own. For the researcher, this means that the scientific outcomes have to be exposed to the 
normal scrutiny in the validation of it. As this article focuses on the implications for 
scientific knowledge, we will proceed by clarifying the role of practitioners with regard 
to the above described three criteria of excellent research; referents, references and 
relevance. 
Accessing Referents 
Just like in any other process of production, the referents are the raw material that 
knowledge production aims to make sense and improve our understanding of. The 
accessibility of these referents, thus, becomes a key issue. There is certainly a lot to learn 
from empiricist and constructivist methods in producing knowledge (Bhaskar, 
Danermark, and Price 2018), but such methods tend to be imbued by certain limitations 
and insufficiencies when academics see it as their privilege to carry them out. For 
example, a statistical survey can be flawed by the choice of questions, which some 
perhaps understand and others do not, some see as provocative and others do not, some 
understand in one way and others in another way, especially when it deals with issues 
like exclusion, segregation, multiculturality and marginalization. Making personal 
interviews can be difficult due to differences in language, culture, class and/or age 
between the interviewer and the interviewee. The latter might not even accept to be 
interviewed or the interviewer cannot get hold of them. 
The access to referents can be improved by working together with practitioners, 
as they are often gatekeeper for certain types of information, specific non-conformist or 
deviant groups and possess practical knowledge on their everyday context, housing 
conditions as well as on interacting with residents. In several surveys on living conditions 
made in Malmö, council workers and young adults were engaged for interviewing. In the 
largest one, 100 council workers, divided in three consecutive rounds which lasted for 
three years, carried out 3,700 interviews with residents, mainly in their own homes. These 
council workers had their ordinary work in the areas were they made the interviews and 
they were on paid leave of absence to carry them out (Stigendal and Östergren 2013). 
As these projects required a special knowledge to conduct interviews, tailor-made 
and problem-based courses were included, building on and supplementing the 
participants’ own knowledge. The latter included knowledge on the population regarding 
its composition and needs, challenges in the neighbourhoods, resources, activities, crime, 
loneliness etc. They had knowledge on the housing areas and their facilities, distances, 
stigmatized neighbourhoods and infrastructures. They knew a lot about how to interact 
with residents. Their knowledge was also used to ask questions. 
Due to all this knowledge, the practitioners became decisive in getting access to 
people as well as in the formulation and asking of questions. Furthermore, they 
contributed by bridging differences and improved communication with people, bearing 
in mind the need to understand the local slang but also other languages (interpreter role), 
also in terms of culture, for example young people or immigrants. They were also decisive 
in getting access to information of many other different kinds, not the least regarding 
rumours or popular culture. 
Producing References 
Deduction and induction have to be learned through education. Thereby, the potential of 
using them is inherent in the individual. In science-society interaction based solely on a 
deductive or inductive methodology, practitioners without high levels of formal education 
are therefore disadvantaged, while researcher are privileged. However, researchers that 
also rely on abduction and retroduction need more than logical thinking, skills in 
statistical analysis or knowledge on qualitative methods. As Danermark et al. (2005, 80-
81) highlight, abduction depends on creativity, fantasy and ability to associate, while 
retroduction relies on an ability to abstract. To succeed with these forms of inference, one 
need more than formal education. In principle, the whole spatial and social context of 
research as well as psychological and social competences of researchers becomes 
important. 
In a KA, the much needed creativity of researchers may be spurred by questions 
from the outside of ordinary research. The experience and knowledge of others can 
stimulate researchers to see something as something different, characteristic of abduction. 
As an example of how that can be achieved, we want to mention the forum theatre, a 
method based on the theatre of the oppressed by Augusto Boal, used in the research 
project Unequal Diversity (Novy 2012). In this project, researchers collaborated with 
Paulo Freire Centre as well as pupils and teachers at two schools, the one a public school 
mainly attended by migrants and the other a grammar school. The use of the forum theatre 
was very helpful in facilitating non-verbal forms of communication. This reduced the 
barrier for the pupils from the secondary school to participate. It also helped the 
researchers to deal with middle to upper middle class pupils from the grammar school 
who have grown up in their own milieu, considering their life, their acting and their 
perception as ‘normal’, sometimes treating socially disadvantaged, younger pupils with 
migrant background with exoticism and patronization. 
Practitioners can contribute by revealing the unconsciously incorporated semiotic 
moments in research by asking other kinds of questions. Researchers benefit from being 
questioned by others and forced to explain themselves using other means of expression 
than the typical ones in the scientific community. This raises awareness of power relations 
incorporated in apparently neutral rationalist discourse. The practitioners may help the 
researchers revealing these unconsciously incorporated semiotic moments and reminding 
them about other potential referents, although by other means of expression. Inclinations 
of researchers to over-emphasize theoretical knowledge may be counterbalanced by the 
stress on relevance from the practitioners´ interests. Working together may enable both 
parties to make the knowledge produced their own. 
Besides providing access to referents, the practitioners in projects like the ones 
above, have contributed to the process of knowledge production by shaping a creative, 
stimulating and curious as well as demanding context for it. They have also contributed 
by seeing things as something else, in line with abduction, and thereby challenged the 
views of the researchers, forcing him/her to elaborate the arguments. Furthermore, the 
practitioners have contributed to retroductive inferences by suggesting the kind of ideas 
called contrafactual. It consists of questions like ‘What if?’ and ‘How would it be if …?’. 
Danermark et al. (2005, 101) describe contrafactual thinking as fundamental for all 
retroduction. In a contrafactual thinking we use our experiences and knowledge on the 
social reality but also our capacity to abstract. Danermark et al. (2005) deal with science, 
but contrafactual thinking is of course a concern for others too, like for example 
practitioners working in neighbourhoods characterized by social exclusion. They have to 
ask themselves many questions about how to do instead. That develops their potential to 
think contrafactually, at least those who choose to represent a potential-oriented 
approach. 
A key prerequisite for good interdisciplinarity research is crossdisciplinarity, 
defined as the ‘ability and the potential to empathize with, understand, and employ the 
concepts of disciplines and fields other than one´s own’ (Bhaskar, Danermark, and Price 
2018, 49). Transdisciplinarity goes a step further by integrating practitioners´ knowledge 
in the research process (Felt et al. 2016; Hirsch Hadorn et al. 2008b). In a critical realist 
research design, transdisciplinarity, furthermore, mobilizes practitioners for abduction 
and retroductive inference to problematize the framing in specific disciplines and policy 
fields. It stimulates the researcher´s creativity and innovativeness. 
Achieving Relevance 
As researchers, we have chosen to devote much effort to produce knowledge on the lack 
of social cohesion in cities, its causes and how to combat it. This is how we want our 
research to become relevant and an important precondition for this is of course such a 
will. Initiating KAs with the aim to become relevant in that sense can attract practitioners 
with a particularly valid potential for contributing to scientific excellence. This may 
include teachers from schools in socially excluded neighbourhoods or professionals 
working with homeless people. They all experience the effects of inequality, either 
directly or indirectly. They all have to deal with it and they therefore bring that desire for 
change to the KA. That includes expectations of the joint knowledge production, which 
may become a very fruitful challenge for the researchers. 
The practitioners contribute by bringing in experiences of actualized knowledge. 
What researchers produce is knowledge as potentials. Actualisation of knowledge 
requires using it. Once potential causes are actualised, something new emerges. 
Therefore, an event must not be reduced to its actualised potentials. An actual cause is 
something else than a potential cause, because the actualisation of that potential cause 
always happens in a specific context with its own properties. That is why natural scientists 
are fond of doing experiments to see what happens when a certain potential is actualised. 
Social scientists cannot treat their objects similar. Therefore, collaborating with 
practitioners in KAs becomes so fruitful as they know about the use of a certain 
knowledge in a specific context. They have experience of what works and thus the 
relevance of knowledge. 
An involvement of practitioners on biased conditions, however, runs the risk of 
not actualising their potentials. To force practitioners to express knowledge in a certain 
way impedes them from making the knowledge produced in KAs their own knowledge. 
Furthermore, it makes it more difficult for researcher to take advantage of the experience 
and knowledge of the practitioners. As an example, street workers in neighbourhoods 
associated with a lack of social cohesion might spend little attention to theoretical 
brooding. They need incentives to participate in KAs. A practitioner would ask ‘What 
can I bring back home to my work in the community?’ Restless kids need to be taken care 
of. Schools have to be kept open despite vandalism, fires, shattered windows and 
burglary. Many of these practitioners probably ask themselves: Are we doing the right 
thing? For some, the answer is clear. They know that they are not doing the right thing, 
but given the circumstances – cuts in public spending, unemployment, raising rents - they 
cannot do anything else. Co-operating with such practitioners on an equal footing can put 
a fruitful pressure on the researchers and provide them with valuable sources of 
inspiration as well as a need to perceive the (positive and negative) potentials of political 
agency. 
An inspiring method used in KAs is non-elitist peer review. Peer review has long 
been used by academics, but the EU Commission made it a part of its ‘open method of 
coordination’, while thereby expanding its field of application to practitioners at different 
levels. At first, it was used only in national comparisons, but the scope became gradually 
expanded. Supported by Eurocities, peer review received a larger spread. The method 
involves a limited number of practitioners working on similar issues who meet and 
evaluate each other's efforts. 
In projects like ‘Young people – from exclusion to inclusion’ (Stigendal 2006), 
researchers participated in such collaborations to develop knowledge on social exclusion 
in several European cities and on how to combat it. In each city, research was made, 
which the practitioners supported by providing information, contacts and interpretations. 
They also brought in the relevance issue, sometimes with a vigour and thereby forced the 
researchers to validate their research not only concerning the explanations about its 
referent objects and its consistency as a reference object, but also with regard to its 
relevance. It all resulted in reports, written by the researchers, which were discussed, 
assessed and improved both locally and internationally. In the end, books were published 
in which concepts were defined, the local neighbourhoods were positioned in their urban 
contexts and compared, many other scientific sources were drawn on, the main 
phenomenon of social exclusion was explained, the method was justified and criteria of 
good practice were suggested. All of it aimed at meeting a scientific standard, but 
presented in a way readable also for practitioners. 
Conclusion 
In this article, we have explored the implications of founding transdisciplinary 
collaborations of knowledge production in critical realism. We call such collaborations 
of researchers and practitioners knowledge alliances, defined as equal partnerships where 
researchers and practitioners work together to produce knowledge, based on an attitude 
of respect, self-reflexivity and curiosity. By that, we have aimed at taking a step further 
beyond interdisciplinary collaborations, limited to partnerships between researchers from 
different disciplines.  
Using the distinction in critical realism between the referents that we refer to 
(what our research is about, the research object) and our references (our research about 
that), we have shown that practitioners can contribute by, firstly, providing access to 
referents; for example by getting access to people, asking questions in understandable 
ways and bridging cultural differences. Secondly, we claim that practitioners can 
contribute by producing references. They can do that by, for example, spurring 
researchers to see something as something else in line with the form of inference called 
abduction and suggesting contrafactual ideas in line with the form of inference called 
retroduction. There is also a third way in which practitioners can contribute. That is to 
bring the currently important societal issues into the research process and thereby putting 
pressure on the knowledge production to become relevant. 
We suggest referents, references and relevance as associated with three forms of 
validity criteria. The notion of excellent research, we claim, should be redefined to 
include all the three and thus treat relevance not as something externally optional, but as 
an integral part. What makes research excellent, thus, depends on what it says about its 
referents (research objects), its conceptual and theoretical consistence as a reference and 
its societal relevance. That practitioners may contribute in all these three senses makes 
the case for transdisciplinary collaborations in knowledge alliances strong. To simplify, 
we claim that practitioners and researchers can be said to meet in the actual, the former 
approaching it from the empirically observable and the latter from the potential. While 
practitioners bring knowledge, mainly of a type called practical, researchers are expected 
to bring the types of knowledge called empirical and theoretical. In research aimed to 
become excellent, knowledge production should be organized in ways, which engages 
these different types of knowledge in a constructive interplay. 
We call this approach potential-oriented. Our deliberate choice of that term as a 
signifier reflects the shifts in philosophy suggested by critical realism, but also a 
sensitivity for how practitioners communicate, think and express themselves. The choice 
of signifier matters immensely, we claim, for knowledge alliances to become successful. 
To highlight the difficulties that may hinder actualizing the potentials we have played on 
the distinction between signifiers and signified, treating these two as the constituents of 
references. In contrast to a potential-oriented approach, evidence-based policy making 
does not believe in this distinction between referents and references, due to its empiricist 
foundations. Therefore, we have called it a problem-oriented approach as it lacks the 
ability to distinguish between the problem and the definition of it, taking what seems to 
be the problem and, thus, the former for granted. 
In this article, we have aimed at taking a step towards a new understanding of 
excellent research. We hope to have paved the way for further work to elaborate a 
consistent research programme for transdisciplinary knowledge production. In this 
respect, methodological questions will become decisive. We assume that there is huge 
potential in systematically using methodological insights from transdisciplinary research 
and link it to interdisciplinary research based on critical realism. 
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